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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HOWARD B. CAHOON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

v.

8976

ROBERT P. PELTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE B E T WE E N
PLAINTIFF AND MRS. SHAW PROVIDES NO
BASIS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT.
Respondent in answer to Point I in Appellant's brief
has cited several California cases holding that a marriage
performed in California before a final California divorce
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decree has been entered is rendered valid by a retroactive
order made after the marriage and dated back to a time
prior to the marriage. This is made possible by reason of a
California statute relied on by Respondent in the instant
case. We, of course, cannot question these cases. The only
question which could arise under the California decisions
would be the constitutionality of such legislation. If, in
the case now before this Court, the parties had been married in California, the Utah court would be bound to follow the California decisions-as the Maryland court did
in Respondent's cited case of Bannister v. Bannister, 181
Md. 177, 29 A. 2d 287. There the marriage in question was
performed in California and a nunc pro tunc decree was
given under the California statute.
The same observation must be made with reference
to the Oregon case In Re Kelley's Estate, 210 Ore. 243, 310
P. 2d 328. In that case, the Oregon court construed a Washington marriage rendered questionable by reason of a Washington nunc pro tunc decree. The State of Washington, as
the Oregon court pointed out, has adopted the same statute
as that in effect in California. It would, therefore, seem
that the Oregon case adds nothing to the California cases
cited by Respondent.
The other state decisions relied upon by Respondent
with the exception of Shippee v. Shippee, 66 A. 2d 77, 95
N. H. 450, involve the traditional common law nunc pro
tunc order which differs from the fictional California nunc
pro tunc order in that the common law order simply conforms the record to show what actually happened. It does
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not change a status. It clarifies a status. In the case of a
common law nunc pro tunc, the order is in reality not retroactive at all. It is corrective by nature and its purpooe is
to conform the record to show the actual facts. In the
instant case, the nunc pro tunc order did much more than
this. It was not made to conform the record to what had
occurred but to have the record show a fiction and to change
a status by reason of the fiction.
The only state case which Respondent has cited which
holds that a retroactive California nunc pro tunc order can
be given extra territorial effect to validate a marriage performed in another jurisdiction is Shippee v. Shippee, supra.
In that case, the New Hampshire court construed as valid
a New York marriage performed at a time when a California divorce had not been finalized. A nunc pro tunc decree had been filed pursuant to the California statute after
the performance of the marriage and made retroactive to
a date prior to the marriage.
The New Hampshire court, after recognizing that the
New York marriage depends upon the New York law, held
that the retroactive California nunc pro tunc order validated an otherwise invalid marriage. The court strangely,
we believe, cited as authority decisions based on the nunc
pro tunc precedents found at common law. These decisions
were from Colorado and New York. As herein indicated,
we fail to see an analogy between the common law nunc pro
tunc order and the retroactive nunc pro tunc order provided
by the statutes of the States of California and Washington.
The New Hampshire court in its decision referred to the
New York case of Merrick v. Merrick, 266 N.Y. 120, 194 N.
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E. 55 and distinguished that case from the Shippee case.
The Merrick case is interesting because in it the New York
court, we believe, took a different view of the effect of a
nunc pro tunc order than that taken by the New Hampshire
court. In the Merrick case, the marriage in question was
performed during a period prohibited by the original decree, which prohibited remarriage for a period of three
years. Suit was brought for annulment and while the suit
was pending, a nunc pro tunc decree was obtained antedating the decree to a date prior to the questioned marriage.
The New York court held that this could not be done saying:
"Irregularity in procedure may, of course, be
corrected by orders nunc pro tunc. Mishkind-Feinberg Realty Co. v. Sidorsky, 189 N. Y. 402, 82 N. E.
448. When a ruling has in fact been made but is
improperly evidenced by a defective mandate, or by
no mandate at all, an appropriate and suitable order
or judgment which manifests the existence of a determination may subsequently be granted to take
effect as of the date of such determination. It cannot record a fact as of a prior date ~vhen the fact did
not then exist. Guarantee Tru~t & Safe Deposit Co.
v. Philadelphia, Reading & N. E. R. Co., 160 N. Y.
1, 7, 54 N. E. 575. An order may not be made nunc
pro tunc which will supply a jurisdictional defect by
~requiring something to be done which has not been
done. Stock v. Mann, 255 N. Y. 100, 103, 174 N. E.
76.
"The validity of a marriage by respondent with
appellant in November, 1925, depended upon a previous modification by the Supreme Court of the decree in Merrick v. Merrick, and no such modification
had been made. New rights, arising out of a matrimonial relationship, cannot be created by a judicial
declaration in 1933 concerning an assumed fact
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which concededly did not exist in 1925 and the existence of which was an essential element of a lawful
marriage." (Emphasis added.)
We submit that the California and Washington statutes, as construed by the courts in those jurisdictions, provide for a retroactive order which is fundamentally and
clearly distinguishable from the common law nunc pro tunc
order which officially recognizes a status already created
by a judicial act. The importance of the distinction is readily apparent if it is applied to the case at bar. On June 27,
1947 when Mrs. Shaw married Respondent, she was not
divorced. If she had been in fact divorced because of a judicial act but no formal entry had been made, a common law
nunc pro tunc entry could have been made to conform the
record to show her true status. In the instant case, no judicial act had been performed, therefore, her status on June
27, 1947 was clearly established. In that status of an undivorced woman, she did not have the capacity under the Utah
law to perform a valid marriage. It, therefore, seems clear
that unless this court is prepared to say that she could
render her marriage valid by her subsequent acts aided by
a retroactive order from a court of another state, she is
still unmarried. If this is so, then it seems Jenkins v. J enkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P. 2d 262, cited in Appellant's brief
at page 17 is wrong. There the court held that a marriage
performed before a decree becomes final is void ab initio.
In Re Miller's and Manufacturers Insurance Company, 106
N. W. 485, 97 Minn. 98, the court held that a contract "void
ab initio" is one that never went into effect.
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One of the cases cited by Respondent in his brief,
Abramson v. Abramson, 49 F. 2d 501, apparently rules
contra to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on this
question. In that case the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia held that the provision of an Illinois
statute which provides that if a divorced party shall marry
within a year, said marriage shall be held absolutely void
does not mean what it says but means that it may be void.
The Federal court said :
''Again, the language of the Illinois statute, that,
if a divorced party shall marry within a year, 'said
marriage shall be held absolutely void,' may be regarded as contemplating a judicial proceeding in
which it should be so declared, and does not go so
far as a language of our Code regarding prohibited
marriages which 'shall be absolutely void ab initio,
without being so decreed, and their nullity may be
shown in any collateral proceedings.'"
The Utah courts as indicated in Appellant's brief have
clearly held contra to the District Court of Columbia on
this question as indicated in Jenkins v. Jenkt"ns, supra and
as indicated in Sanders v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah
372, 230 Pac. 1026 and In Re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503,
167 P. 2d 690.
POINT II.
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE UTAH
LAW.
We submit that whether or not Nevada recognizes that
an action for criminal conversation exists, as pointed out
by the Respondent in his brief, does not bear upon the arSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gurnent made by Appellant under Point II of his brief to
the effect that the cause of action does not exist in the State
of Utah.
Respondent in arguing against Point II of Appellant's
brief relies on Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 Pac. 1096
(1915) and Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 62,
10 Sup. Ct. 792, 34 L. Ed. 481. Mormon Church v. United
States was decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1889, nine years before the State of Utah adopted the
English common law pursuant to Chapter 3, 63-3-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. It is difficult to understand how
this decision can assist this Court. A decision by the United
States Supreme Court determining Federal law applicable
to a territory under an Organic Act is not authority for
the State Supreme Court to apply to construction of a statute passed nine years later. It might even be argued that
the State Legislature of Utah enacted the foregoing statute
having in mind the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Mormon Church v. United States, supra.
The Hatch case was decided after statehood. N evertheless it construed the rights of a wife which arose prior to
statehood. Because of this, the court was primarily concerned with the same question which concerned the United
States Supreme Court in the Mormon Church case, supra.
This concern involved the construction of the Organic Act
and the acts of the Territorial Assembly. The court observed this when it stated:
"This is far from asserting that the common
law of England was intended to be extended over or
was transplanted into the territory."
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The court announced what we believe is the rule followed in Utah when it said:

"* * * whenever, in this country, the English
common law was adopted, it was adopted only so
far as new conditions and surroundings made it applicable * * * But nowhere in this country, except by positive enactment was the English common
law fixed and immutable; not even in England."
After quoting to the same effect from Justice Story,
the Utah Supreme Court further said:
"This is familiar doctrine. How often has it
been applied to this western country to riparian
rights ; elsewhere to descent where the civil and not
the English common law was followed; to ancient
lights and property rights of a feme covert where
partly the English common law and partly the civil
law was followed."
We do not urge that the common law of England is
immutable or fixed but simply that it was adopted in so
far as it is not repugnant to or conflict with the laws of
the United States or inconsistent with our natural and
physical conditions.
In this regard we note that the Legislative Assembly
which in 1898 enacted into law the English common law
was enacted 30-2-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides in part as follows :
"A wife may

* * * maintain an action

* * * in her own name * * * There shall
be no right of recovery by the husband on account
of personal injury or wrong to his wife * * * "
(Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

The foregoing legislation was in derogation of the
English common law idea that a wife had no right of action; that she was in fact a chattel of her husband. It was
this archaic idea which prohibited a wife from suing in her
own name and which gave her husband a property right in
her person which gave rise to the cause of action for criminal conversation in the first place. Thus, criminal conversation, as pointed out in Appellant's brief was initially considered a trespass vi et armis.
We submit if the archaic ideas which gave rise to the
cause of action no longer exist there is no reason or sound
policy why the unpopular action should be installed as a
modern judicial fixture by the Supreme Court of Utah.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF
WEALTH TO BE INTRODUCED ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
What has been said in Point II is apropos of Appellant's position stated in Point III.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
NEW TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
Plaintiff argues that his Motion for a New Trial was
timely inasmuch as it was filed within the permissive time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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after the entry of an amended judgment which was prepared by plaintiff's counsel.
The fact is that at no time until September 5, 1958
did plaintiff make a Motion for a New Trial on the First
Cause of Action (R. 76), notwithstanding that a judgment
was entered on April 17, 1958. Plaintiff argues that the
judgment entered on April 17, 1958 was not a judgment
as to the First Cause of Action. The judgment must be read
and considered as one whole instrument. When so read
there can be no doubt that it constituted a judgment of no
cause of action on the First Cause of Action, and that it
gave notice to that effect to all parties.
Plaintiff also argues that the Order of the Trial Court
for a new trial was as to both causes of action. This is
contrary to the facts as shown by the record. Defendant's
Motion for a New Trial was directed solely to the Second
Cause of Action (R. 73). Arguments on the Motion for a
New Trial were restricted to the Second Cause of Action.
The Court's order of June 3, 1958 expressly states that
defendant's Motion for a New Trial is granted (R. 76). The
only Motion for a New Trial ever made by defendant was
as to the Second Cause of Action.
POINT V.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 11.
Plaintiff's answer, and apparently only answer, to the
argument made by defendant in Point V of his brief is
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that defendant failed to make proper exception to Instruction No. 11. Defendant submits that a reading of the exceptions as a whole will show that sufficient exception was
taken to the said Instruction.
A reading of Instruction No. 11 (R. 124), will show
that the words "in Utah" were stricken after the instructions were typed, and the words "outside of Nevada" inserted in longhand in place thereof. Although these changes
were made prior to the time that the jury was instructed
and prior to the time that the jury retired for deliberation,
the same were not shown on the copies of the instructions
given to counsel for the parties, as a result of which some
confusion resulted in the taking of exceptions.
In any event, this Court has the discretion, under Rule
51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to review the error

contained in this instruction.
POINT VII.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 22, AND IN
GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 13 AND NO. 15.
In answer to the argument made by defendant under
Point VII of his brief, plaintiff notes that the cases cited
by defendant are extremely old cases. Defendant concedes
that the cases are old and that the principles of law stated
therein are old. However, the said principles constitute
basic law.
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A husband is entitled, as one of the rights flowing from
the marriage, to the services of his wife, including ordinary
household duties, without compensation to her. So long as
this right is possessed by the husband, he can recover damages for loss of services. However, the divorce decree made
and entered on December 4, 1956 by the Nevada Court in
Cahoon v. Cahoon, terminated the marriage relationship and
terminated any right which the plaintiff had to the services
of his said wife from the date of the entry of that decree.
After the entry of that decree, plaintiff was no longer entitled to the services of his said wife. Likewise, he was
not entitled to recover any damages for loss of services
occurring thereafter. One cannot recover damages except
for the invasion of some legal right. Plaintiff had no legal
right to the services for which he was awarded damages
after December 4, 1956.
Defendant submits that it was not the intention of the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Wilson v. Oldroyd, cited
by plaintiff at page 26 of his brief, to permit the recovery
of damages without a legal right. Any statement by the
Court in that case suggesting that damages might be recovered for loss of services after the date of a divorce decree is dicta. Moreover, the Court does not state, in its
opinion in the Oldroyd case, that recovery might be had for
loss of services after the time of the divorce.
Whatever the situation may have been in the Oldroyd
case, the undisputed fact here is that plaintiff's former
wife was granted a decree of divorce on grounds of extreme
mental cruelty. This fact is undisputed and the Court cannot go behind the Nevada decree.
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POINT VIII.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE
LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES.
What has been said in connection with Point VII applies with equal force to Point VIII. The Trial Court's Instruction No. 15 (R. 128 on Life Expectancy Tables) permitted the jury to award damages for loss of services and
other elements of damage from the divorce on December
4, 1956 for and during the life expectancy of the plaintiff
and his former spouse, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff has had no legal right to the services of said spouse
since December 4, 1956.
POINT IX.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE SECOND TRIAL IN ALLOWING
AN OFFSET OF $17,000.00 AGAINST ONLY
THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS JUDGMENT.
In answer to the argument made by defendant under
Point IX of his brief, plaintiff argues that Instruction No.
12 (R. 126) related to damages for criminal conversation
and that Instruction No. 13 (R. 126-127) was confined to
elements of damage for alienation of affections. This is
not correct. There is no statement contained in the said
Instruction No. 13 that it relates solely or is restricted to
the cause of action for alienation of affections. Defendant,
at all times assumed that Instruction No. 13 related to both

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
causes of action and because of that assumption defendant
took exception to Instruction No. 13 on the grounds that
it did not require a diminution of the value of lost services
by reason of the value of the husband's duty to support.
As stated under Point IX in defendant's brief, loss of the
value of services is a proper element of damages in both
causes of action. Plaintiff recognized this, as shown by
plaintiff's Requested Instruction A (R. 86). At no time has
plaintiff argued, either in the proceedings in the Trial
Court or in its brief, that loss of services is not an element
of damages in the action for criminal conversation.
Defendant submits that the instructions permitted the
jury to find, and that the jury did find, loss of services as
an element of damages with respect to the cause of action
for criminal conversation. That being the case, defendant
was entitled to have the value of lost services reduced by
the value of the plaintiff's duty to support. The jury fully
intended that the $17,000.00 determined by them to be the
value of the duty to support be offset against both awards.
POINT X.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING COU:N"SEL FOR THE
DEFENDANT TO READ TO THE JURORS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM DEPOSITIONS IN WHICH THE WITNESSES CLAIMED
THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
In answer to the argument made by defendant under
Point X of his brief, plaintiff states at page 38 of plain-
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tiff's brief, that defendant did not request instructions to
the effect that no adverse inference could be drawn against
defendant from the fact that Mrs. Cahoon claimed her privilege or that she refused to answer certain questions. This
statement is incorrect. In his Requested Instructions 24,
25, and 26, defendant requested that the jury be charged
that no finding or inference of guilt could be drawn from the
fact that Mrs. Cahoon or other witnesses declined to answer
questions.
A full consideration of the authorities cited in Defendant's brief will show that the Trial Court committed prejudicial error in permitting counsel to read to the jurors
questions and answers from depositions in which the witnesses claimed their privilege. The authorities cited by
plaintiff can be readily distinguished.
POINT XII.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20.
In answer to the argument made by defendant under
Point XII of Defendant's brief, plaintiff states that the
requested instruction was given to the jury at the first
trial. Obviously, the giving of said instruction at the first
trial could not obviate the error of a failure to give same at
the second trial.
Plaintiff also argues that the substance of the requested
instruction was given to the jury. This argument ignores
the well established rule that a party is entitled to have
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his theory of the case presented to the jury in the form of
an instruction.
Plaintiff also argues that the substance of the said
Instruction was labored by the defendant in the evidence
and in arguments to the jury. This is correct, but the evidence and oral arguments to the jury do not constitute an
acceptable substitute for an instruction to the jury from
the Court.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has endeavored in the foregoing Reply Brief
to consider points raised by the Respondent's brief which
may not have been fully covered in Appellant's brief. No
effort has been made to reiterate arguments which have
already been made. With respect to Respondent's crossappeal, Appellant submits that no prejudicial error was
committed by the Trial Court in favor of the Respondent.
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Clifford L. Ashton,
Leonard J. Lewis,
Counsel for Appellant.
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